Wondering why I've been a bit quiet? Worried I've stopped fighting for freedom? No fear, Katherine Henry's still here! Here's just a tiny bit of what I've been working on these last couple of months:

 Wondering why I've been a bit quiet? Worried I've stopped fighting for freedom? No fear, Katherine Henry's still here! Here's just a tiny bit of what I've been working on these last couple of months:

Certainly, “the Due Process Clause offers two separate types of protections - substantive and procedural.” Upper Peninsula Power Co v Village of L'anse, ___ Mich App ___ (2020) (Docket No. 349833). Substantive due process is at issue here through subject matter jurisdiction which “‘concerns a court’s abstract power to try a case of the kind or character of the one pending and is not dependent on the particular facts of the case.’” People v Lown, 488 Mich 242, 268 (2011). Aside from the various substantive due process issues in this case, this Constitutional Catastrophe exposes several procedural due process violations against Defendant’s rights, as well. Given the legal right Defendant had to be on the public property, and that a deputy’s plain ignorance of the law (as opposed to a reasonable misinterpretation of the law) cannot create a basis for probable cause, Defendant’s arrest was made without probable cause, violating her right to due process. Moreover, given the circumstances, an arrest by physically taking Defendant into custody was unreasonable. Even more so, the excessive use of force and intentional infliction of emotional distress upon Defendant is beyond unjustifiable.

Furthermore, “[p]rocedural due process requires notice, an opportunity to be heard, and an impartial decisionmaker.” Upper Peninsula Power Co v Village of L'anse, ___ Mich App ___ (2020) (Docket No. 349833). Regarding the notice requirement, in a criminal case that means “the accused shall . . . be informed of the nature of the accusation.” Const 1963, art I, § 20. See also US Const, Am VI. However, on November 3, 2020, Defendant was issued Ticket SH 166684 (Exhibit 11, Civil Infraction Copy of Ticket 166684), and the copy with which Defendant was served is nearly impossible to read for the incident number section, date, case type, MCL Cite, Description, Complainant’s Signature, Officer’s Name, and Officer’s ID number. Then, after issuing the citation and serving it upon Defendant, Deputy Langlois altered the ticket before filing it with the court. Consequently, the ticket issued and served upon Defendant is substantially different than the ticket filed with the court (Exhibit 12, Court Copy 1 of Ticket 166684).

In fact, this case was legally commenced as a civil infraction, yet without ever serving Defendant criminal process, it is being prosecuted as a misdemeanor. [A “civil infraction action is commenced upon the issuance and service of a citation,” so the case against Defendant commenced on November 3rd upon Deputy Langlois issuing and serving Defendant civil infraction Ticket SH 166684. MCL 257.741(1). The procedural requirements for citations, although found in the Michigan Vehicle Code, apply when those same citation forms are used in non-traffic cases per MCL 257.727c (2) and MCL 264.9c. See also, SCAO Administrative Memorandum 2003-06, Michigan Uniform Law Citation.] Indeed, our criminal laws and procedures require the citation, or notice, given to defendants to be as complete as possible, specifically stating the substance of the accusation. Code of Criminal Procedure, MCL 764.1d; MCR 6.101 (“The complaint must include the substance of the accusation against the accused and the name and statutory citation of the offense.); MCL 257.728(1). The only description of the offence is “MCL 750.552 Trespass.” Having absolutely no descriptive words does not describe the alleged illegal conduct as completely as possible, nor does it recite the substance of the accusation. Clearly this does not qualify as the required complaint stating all the facts and circumstances constituting the statutory offense. People v Husted, 52 Mich 624 (1884).

Additionally, the “constitutional safeguards relating to the integrity of the criminal process attend every stage of a criminal proceeding, starting with arrest.” Cox v Louisiana, 379 US 559, 562 (1965). This means that all Defendants must be afforded open access to the courts, just the same as other litigants, according to the court rules. However, Defendant was denied that equal and fair access to the court. On November 12, 2020, when Defendant spoke with the court to get a hearing date, she was told the January 11, 2021 date would be both for her arraignment and for her motion for summary disposition. Yet, when she called to inquire about the court’s preferred e-filing method, she was told that she was not allowed to have the hearing on her motion for summary disposition until some undisclosed time after her arraignment. Id. at p 2 (highlighted portion). However, this directly conflicts with MCR 2.116(B)(2), which allows “a motion under this rule [to] be filed any time.” (Further, the SCAO Misdemeanor Arraignments Flow Chart clearly states in a highlighted box off to the side on both pages that “Motions can be scheduled anytime before and after adjudication.” Available at https://courts.michigan.gov/Administration/SCAO/Resources/Documents/other/MisdemeanorArraignmentsFlowChart.pdf, accessed February 13, 2021.) The “constitutional safeguards attending every stage of a criminal proceeding” also means that when a due process issue or subject matter jurisdiction issue gets presented to a judge, it is improper and a dereliction of duty to claim no “authority” and pass it off to the judge at the next hearing. Yet when Defendant raised these issues to the judge at arraignment, he responded, “Well that’s something to take up at the pre-trial conference then, okay? . . . I have no authority to do anything today other than to tell you what the deputy has charged you with.”

From the judge rolling his eyes during Defendant’s oral argument on her motion for summary disposition, to the dismissive manner Defendant and her attorney Greg Todd were treated at the February 4th hearing (showing no respect for either as officers of the court), to the aggressive manner Defendant and her attorney are treated by deputies each time upon arrival to the courthouse, one wonders how this could possibly amount to a fair and impartial process. This is all despite the US Supreme Court holding that procedural due process requires the alleged to be given notice of the proceedings against him, an opportunity to defend himself, as well as the assurance that the matter will be conducted in a fair manner. Hannah v Larche, 363 US 420 (1960), reh den 364 US 855 (1960). The following portions discuss the remaining due process violations in more detail, starting with the one requiring dismissal with prejudice.